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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
deprived of self-defense if only he be reasonably free from fault
in provoking the difficulty. This distinction is for practical pur-
poses unimportant except in a few cases, 2 as only rarely would
the defendant be reasonably free from fault and yet not com-
pletely without fault in bringing on the difficulty.
The Mississippi courts apparently are more liberal to the de-
fendant than jurisdictions following the Missouri Supreme Court.
In Smith v. State, ' the court reversed a conviction of murder
upon an improper refusal of the trial court to give an instruction
requested that insulting words were not sufficient provocation to
deprive the defendant of self-defense. This case is similar to the
Missouri case of State v. Culler"4 in that the court failed to state
whether in such a situation the defendant would be entitled to
rely upon perfect or imperfect self-defense. Dicta in other Miss-
issippi cases lean toward the former.0 5
JAMES C. LOGAN, '36.
"PUBLIC USE" IN FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN
Numerous projects contemplated or actually initiated by the
present Administration require the use of the federal power of
condemnation. Especially significant at the moment is the bill
now before Congress appropriating some four billion dollars to
be used by the President in various ways for relief against the
effects of the depression, and authorizing him to acquire any real
or personal property or any interest therein by the power of
eminent domain.' It is the purpose of this discussion to examine
the extent to which the United States Government, as distin-
guished from the States, can thus take private property, aside
from questions of procedure and just compensation, as evidenced
by the types of cases in which the power has been exercised in
the past, and the principles established therein. In considering
the problem it is well to remember that the power to condemn,
practically if not theoretically, rises from the power to appropri-
ate for the general welfare, and that the questions which arise
in considering the validity of acts of either type are basically
analogous.
For nearly a hundred years after the adoption of the Con-
stitution it was considered doubtful by both writers and states-
6? McBryde v. State, (1908) 156 Ala. 44, 47 So. 302. Brewer v. State,
(1909) 160 Ala. 66, 49 So. 336.6S (1898) 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 260.
64 Supra, note 15.
Or Prine v. State, (1896) 73 Miss. 838, 19 So. 711; Lofton v. State, (1902)
79 Miss. 732, 31 So. 420; Rogers v. State, (1903) 82 Miss. 479, 34 So. 320;
Lucas v. State, (1915) 109 Miss. 82, 67 So. 851. See also Brown v. State,
(1877) 58 Ga. 212.
' H. J. Res. 117.
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men whether the power of condemnation resided in the federal
government at all. When land was necessary for the use of the
United States the taking was done in a State court under the
authority of a State statue.2 But the Supreme Court's declara-
tion in Kohl v. United States3 that the national government pos-
sesses an inherent power of eminent domain, implied from the
prohibition against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation,4 furnished an answer to the objectors.
That this attribute of sovereignty may be exercised to enable
the nation to perform its functions has been affirmed in many
subsequent decisions. 5 The power may be used directly by Con-
gress or delegated to executive agencies6 or private corporations.7
And lezislative declarations of the necessity for its use are final
and not subject to review in the courts.8 But although the
Supreme Court has never declared an act of condemnation in-
valid,, as in excess of the constitutional powers of a federal
agency, it has not said that the scope of activity in this field is
limitless. On the contrary, it has, both directly and by way of
dictum, consistently stated that the taking must be for a public
purpose, and that in the courts alone rests jurisdiction to settle
the limits of this ambiguous term."0 The key to its meaning must
remain substantially in the types of acts which have been al-
lowed, and the analogies which may be drawn therefrom, in the
absence of decisions on the other side.
The most obvious exercise of the power of eminent domain
for a public use occurs when the government takes property to
aid it in carrying out its normal functions as an operating organi-
zation. Included in this category might be land for public build-
21 Nichols, Eminent Domain (2nd ed. 1917) sec. 34; Corwin, National
Supremacy (1913) pp. 260-5.
& (1876) 91 U. S. 367.
4 Const. U. S. Amendment V.
5Cf. Mississippi River Boom Co. v. Patterson (1879) 98 U. S. 406; U. S.
v. Jones (1883) 109 U. S. 513; U. S. v. Lynah (1903) 188 U. S. 445. The
power extends also to the territories. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
By. Co. (1889) 135 U. S. 642.
a Old Dominion Land Co. v. U. S. (1925) 269 U. S. 55; U. S. v. Oregon
Ry. and Navigation Co. (C. C. D. Ore 1883) 16 F. 524.
7California v. Central Pacific Ry. Co. (1888) 127 U. S. 1; Cherokee
Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., supra note 5; Luxton v. North River
Bridge Co. (1883) 153 U. S. 525.
8 Mills v. County of St. Clair (1850) 8 How. 569; Monongahela Naviga-
tion Co. v. U. S. (1893) 148 U. S. 312. Where the power has been delegated
to an official (the Secretary of War), his judgment is also final. U. S. v.
Oregon Ry. and Navigation Co., supra note 6.
9But see U. S. v. Lands in Louisville Ky. (Jan. 1935) D. C. W. D. Ky.
2 U. S. Law Week No. 21 P. 9 for a recent example of such action by a
District Court.
10 Shoemaker v. U. S. (1892) 147 U. S. 282; U. S. v. Gettysburg Electric
Ry. Co. (1896) 160 U. S. 668; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles (1922) 262 U. S.
700; 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) sec. 1036.
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ings,11 , a park for the District of Columbia,'12 and land taken to
irrigate the public domain of the United States. 3 In connection
with the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce many
acts of condemnation have been upheld. These comprise taking
for light-houses, harbors and dams for ocean navigation; locks,
dams and canals for inland waterways; and railroads, highways
and bridge approaches for overland transportation and com-
merce. 4 Condemnation under the Act 1 creating the Federal
Power Commission, which Congress declared was for the purpose
of aiding navigation and constructing dams, etc., on public lands
and navigable streams, was upheld as for a public purpose, al-
though the incidental object was the generation and sale to
private consumers of surplus power. 6 It is in this field of activity
that the national power of eminent domain has been most widely
used, and the existence of valid objections to the propriety of its
application, in view of the acknowledged breadth of the field
covered by the commerce clause, is doubtful.
Taking for military purposes, too, is established. 7 It results
naturally from the power to make war and levy taxes to provide
for the common defense. The recent gold hoarding case, fur-
nishes another illustration. In that decision eminent domain was
held to extend to any type of commodity, 9 whether affected with
2" Kohl v. U. S., supra note 3.
2 Shoemaker v. U. S., supra note 10.
1-3 Burley v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9, 1910) 179 F. 1. In Brown v. U. S. (1923)
263 U. S. 78 the Court allowed condemnation for a town site to replade a
town flooded by the completion of a federal water project. It was a public
use, since it was necessarily connected with the proper operations of the
government.
14 U. S. v. Lynah, supra note 5 (dam and harbor); Chappell v. U. S.
(1896) 160 U. S. 499 (lighthouse); U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co. (1912)
229 U. S. 53; Re Condemnations for Improvement of River Rouge (D. C.
E. D. Mich., 1920) 266 F. 105; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U. S., supra
note 8 (lock for canal); U. S. v. Oregon Ry. and Navigation Co., supra
note 8. For cases concerning public highways and railroads see Cherokee
Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., supra note 5, Luxton v. North River
Bridge Co., supra note 7, and California v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., supra
note 7.
5 16 U. S. C. A. sees. 791, 807.16 Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co. (D. C. N. D. Ala., 1922) 283
F. 606. But if the sale of surplus power is not merely an incidental feature,
stockholders in a competing utility company are deprived of their property
without due process of law. And this is not justified by a purpose of social
experimentation (the "yardstick" idea). Grubb, J., in Ashwander et al. v.
TVA et al. (Dec. 1934) D. C. N. D. Ala. 2 U. S. Law Week No. 14, p. 45.
'7 Old Dominion Land Co. v. U. S., supra note 6. The government may
condemn contracts for ships in time of war. Brooks Scanlon Corp. v. U. S:
(1924) 265 U. S. 106.
18 Campbell v. Chase National Bank (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1933) 5 F.
Supp. 156.
1) But see Colvin, Property which cannot be reached by the power bf
Eminent Domain for a Public Use or Purpose (1929) 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
137.
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a public interest or not. The taking of gold coin in bullion is a
proper exercise of a power incident to that of regulating the value
of currency. Creation of a memorial at the battlefield of Gettys-
burg as an object lesson for future citizens is a public purpose
for which land may be appropriated, because of its national
character and importance.2 ,
In dealing with the types of situations classified above, certain
general rules of construction and treatment have been adopted
the influence of which seems likely to be more important than the
actual sets of facts which have brought cases within the limits of
the term public use. In the first place, the legislative judgment
that the purpose is a public one, either expressly stated or implied
from the mere exercise of the power, will be respected unless it
is palpably without reasonable foundation. 21 This principle has
been applied most frequently to State acts, for there the addi-
tional factor enters that special local conditions, whose influence
is most apparent to State courts and lawmakers, bear largely on
the nature of the use in question.22 But when Congress con-
demned land, ostensibly for military purposes, but actually to
avoid forfeiture of buildings erected during the war to a lessor
because of the failure of the government to renew the lease, it
was held that the taking was valid because military purposes at
least may have been entertained. 2 In other words, Congress'
decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an
impossibility. Secondly, if the primary purpose behind an act of
condemnation is one which may be characterized as a public use,
incidental objectives do not hazard the validiy of the taking.
This rule has been applied extensively to the sale of excess
power,2 4 and also to cases where irrigation of the public domain
was to be accompanied by distribution of water to unreclaimed
lands of private individuals.25 It should be noted that many cases
have taken pains to point out that the private purpose must be
20 U. S. v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., supra note 10.
21 Idem; Walker v. Shasta Power Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1908) 160 F. 856. It
is interesting to note that several State Constitutions have expressly pro-
vided that the question whether a contemplated use is public shall be judi-
cially determined without regard to any legislative assertion. e. g. Const.
Mo. Art. 2, Sec. 20.
22 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, supra note 6. The court also stated in that
case that not only the present demands of the public, but those which may
be fairly anticipated in the future are to be considered. And see Green v.
Frazier (1920) 253 U. S. 233 for a discussion of the weight of local deter-
minations on the allied question of taxation for a public use and the XIVth
Amendment.
23 Old Dominion Land Co. v. U. S., supra note 6.
24 U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra note 14; Alabama Power Co. v.
Gulf Power Co., supra note 16; Kaukauma Co. v. Green Bay etc. Canal Co.
(1891) 142 U. S. 254, 273.
25 Burey v. U. S., supra note 13.
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clearly incidental .2 Third, it is not essential that the entire
community, or even any considerable portion, should directly
enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a
public use.2 7 But there is authority for the proposition that the
use should be open in theory to all the public, even though prac-
tically available to only a part.28 The enjoyment need not, how-
ever, be free in the sense that charges for the use or service are
prohibited . 2  Finally, in cases involving state action the very
broad doctrine has been announced that "an ulterior public ad-
vantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of
private property for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private
use." 30 And there may be "exceptional times and places in which
the very foundations of public welfare could not be laid without
requiring concessions from individuals to one other on due com-
pensation, which, under other circumstances, would be left wholly
to voluntary consent." 31 If the broad ultimate purpose and not
the immediate one is to be the test of the character of the use,
as these quotations might seem to indicate, whatever would bene-
fit, in the largest sense of the term, would be valid.
Congress is now considering a grant to the President of the
power to "acquire, by purchase or by the power of eminent do-
main, any real or personal property or any interest therein, and
improve, develop, maintain, grant, sell, lease (with or without the
privilege of purchasing) or otherwise dispose of any such prop-
erty or interest therein. '32 This right is to be used in furtherance
of projects including clearance of slums, rural housing, rural
electrification, reforestation, prevention of soil erosion and recla-
mation of blighted areas, improving roads and constructing
national highways, grade crossing elimination, and other Federal
and non-Federal works. Among the proposals enumerated only
one, highway improvement and construction, has been passed on
26 "It would be strange if the national government could enter the terri-
tory of a state (where there were no public lands) and by legislation pro-
vide a system of irrigation for the private lands within the state and con-
trol its administration. It would indeed be a strange proceeding, and ob-
viously wholly outside of the authority of Congress." Idem.
27 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, supra note 10; Fallbrook Irrigation Dis-
trict v. Bradley (1896) 164 U. S. 112; Mt. Vernon Woodberry Cotton Duck
Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. (1915) 240 U. S. 29.
28 U. S. v. Lands in Louisville, Ky., supra note 9.
29 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn (1897) 166 U. S. 685.
30 Holmes, J., in Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104. The
applicability of this case, involving state bank deposit insurance, to federal
question is, of course, indirect at the most.31 Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. (1905) 200 U. S. 527. See
also Clark v. Nash (1905) 198 U. S. 361.
32 "Pr'ovided, That any real property or interest therein acquired here-
under shall be reserved for the purpose of the project or projects for which
it is acquired and shall not be included within the unreserved portion of the
public domain. H. J. Res. 117.
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by the courts as a public use for which the federal power of
eminent domain may be exercised, although grade-crossing elimi-
nation, as an adjunct of interstate commerce, might be added by
analogy. Federal electrification schemes have been upheld, it is
true, but only when they were an incident to improvements in
navigation. And several recent cases in the lower courts, not
concerned with eminent domain, have denied the right of the
national government to spend public funds for the construction
of local power plants, the expenditure not being for the public
use of the people of the United States.3 3 The United States Dis-
trict Court held in United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville,
Ky."1 that Title II of the N. I. R. A. gave power to condemn only
for a public purpose, and that a taking for a slum clearance
project was not for such a purpose and so was invalid. The
Court concluded that it was not a governmental function to build
private homes for sale or lease to individuals; and the fact that
tenants were to be selected by government agencies precluded
the theory that the use was to be a right open to all the public on
equal terms. And the statement that the state may not take
private property for the purpose of selling or leasing it to others
has considerable support in authority.3 5 It would seem that the
same objections apply in the case of rural housing. Reforesta-
tion, the prevention of soil erosion and reclamation may conceiv-
ably have a more national, as contrasted with purely local,
purpose, in view of their fairly well demonstrated economic
effects on large sections of the country; but speculation on their
possible relation to the legal concept of public use, as well as on
that of the infinite other possibilities opened to the administra-
tion under this law, would be worse than useless.
The similarity between the conception of public use as applied
to eminent domain and the public purpose necessary, in theory
at least, to justify taxation cannot be disregarded. The Supreme
Court has never invalidated a tax laid by Congress on the ground
that it was not for a public purpose, but it has often followed
local tribunals in holding that State legislation was unconstitu-
tional for that reason, being a deprivation of the individual's
33 Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, Idaho (Dec.
1984) D. C. D. Idaho 2 U. S. Law Week No. 18, p. 12; Ashwander et al. v.
TVA et al., supra note 16.
24Supra note 9. The case was placed on the docket of the U. S. Supreme
Court on Feb. 9th.
5 The power is abused when property is taken, not for public use, but
to be leased out to private occupants to the end of raising money. Mills
et al. v. County of St. Clair et al., supra note 8N; Buckingham et al. v.
Smith and Dille (1840) 10 Ohio 288, 297. A definite right or use in the
business or undertaking to which the property is devoted must result to the
public from the law itself, not from the will of the donee of the power.
Borden v. Trespalacios Rice and Irrigation Co. (1905) 98 Tex. 494, 86
S. W. 11. Certiorari denied 204 U. S. 667.
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property without due process of law.3 6 One difficulty, not present
in condemnation proceedings, which has prevented a clear test
of the taxing power is that there is ordinarily not sufficient in-
terest to give the individual standing in the courts and a right
to contest the legislation.Y But the dispute over the extent of the
national power to tax is based on two fundamental theories; one,
that Congress may levy to provide for the general welfare in the
broadest sense, and two, that it can tax only in connection with
and to enable it to carry out the powers specifically granted by
the Constitution.8 And the same two opinions exist in the field
of eminent domain. Taking is proper, on the one hand, where it
is for the welfare, good, or benefit of the people ;39 or it is im-
proper unless necessary to the execution of granted powers.40
The authoritative adoption of one of these conflicting theories
would aid the settlement of a situation which is none too clear.
T. S. MCPHEETERS. JR. '36.
THE JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN COMPENSATED AND ACCOMMODATION
SURETIES IN MISSOURI
The term "surety" as used before the latter part of the nine-
teenth century indicated the private accommodation surety who
assumed legal obligations from motives of friendliness and not
pecuniary gain, by becoming a party to a contract prepared and
drawn by another., The contract of suretyship antedated the
Christian era by more than 2500 years; as a consequence, the
rules of suretyship were formulated during the earlier and more
plastic period of legal development. 2 In view of the gratuitous
nature of the undertaking of the private accommodation surety,
and the severity of the penalty imposed upon him in case of the
36 Loan Association v. Topeka (1874) 20 Wall. 655; Cole v. La Grange
(1884) 113 U. S. 1. When the highest court of a state has declared a tax
was for a public purpose its decision has never been reversed, though
power to do so has not been disclaimed. See Hairston v. Danville &
Western Ry. (1908) 208 U. S. 598.
37 Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447.
38 Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548.
The case of Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, supra
note 33, takes the contrary view, holding that because of the Xth Amend-
ment Congress can appropriate only in the exercise of its enumerated
powers.
39 See the quotations from Mr. Justice Holmes, supra notes 30 and 31.
40 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., supra note 5; U. S. v.
Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., supra note 6.
1 See Arnold, The Compensated Surety, 26 Col. If. Rev. 171 (1926).2 Lloyd, The Surety, (1917) 66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 40; Morgan, The History
and Economics of Suretyship, (1927) 12 Cornell L. Quart., 153, 487; Brandt,
Suretyship and Guaranty, (3rd. ed. 1905) 17.
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